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Despite the presence of favourable factors for a 
successful downstream industry—namely, large 
reserves of crude oil (the 10th largest in the 
world), domestic demand for refined petroleum 
that exceeds current production and historical 
government efforts to encourage a domestic 
industry—Nigeria has rarely been able to meet its 
domestic demand and become a net exporter. Less 
than 1 per cent of national GDP comes from the 
downstream oil sector.
Political interference in the management of the 
refineries has created obstacles for the sector 
and paved the way for persistent under-capacity 
utilization. Voices for full privatization of the 
downstream sector have risen on the grounds that 
“ordinary citizens are not the main beneficiaries 
of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC)’s unreliable refineries.”4 Nigeria’s 
downstream policy to date has resulted more in 
draining government coffers than in promoting 
value addition and local benefits.
2NIGERIA’S DREAM OF 
BECOMING A NET EXPORTER  
OF REFINED PRODUCTS 
Nigerian oil has a high export value given that it is 
less corrosive for refinery infrastructure and easier to 
refine into high-value products such as gasoline or 
jet fuel compared to other types of crude.  However, 
only a decade after discovering its first oil, Shell and 
BP built the first refinery in 1965 in Port Harcourt 
with an initial capacity of 38,000 barrels per day 
(b/d). The intent was to satisfy domestic gasoline 
demand for the transportation market.5
In 1969, the government passed the National 
Petroleum Act,6 which vests ownership of all 
petroleum resources of Nigeria in the state and 
stipulates a domestic obligation for international 
oil companies, requiring upstream producers to 
“subsidize” the local refineries by selling around 8 per 
cent of their crude oil production at a price of about 
USD 1.80/barrel, which was about 5 per cent of world 
market price up until around 1985. 
Throughout the 1970s, the government progressively 
increased its participation in the equity of all oil 
international oil companies’ operations in Nigeria 
until it reached 60 per cent in 1978. The Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was 
established to control the government’s share of the 
international oil operations.  
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In 1975 and 1976, the government awarded the 
construction of two additional refineries to 
international consortia: the Warri Refinery project 
with a production capacity of 100,000 b/d7 for 
producing motor oil for Nigerian consumption, and 
the Kaduna Refinery project with a production 
capacity of 50,000 b/d for regular fuels and 50,000 
b/d for lubricating oils, waxes and asphalt. These two 
refineries were government-owned, and in 1978 the 
Port Harcourt Refinery was also nationalized, with 
the government acquiring the 
remaining 40 per cent of equity 
from Shell and BP. In 1985, the 
NNPC commissioned a second 
refinery at Port Harcourt with 
a capacity of 150,000 b/d. The 
intention was to turn Nigeria 
into a net exporter of refined 
petroleum over the following 
two years.8
By the end of 1991, however, decreasing production 
at the Warri and Kaduna refineries combined with 
increasing domestic demand for refined petroleum 
stopped exports from the new Port Harcourt 
refinery.9 Since that time, Nigerian has been a net 
importer of refined petroleum products. In 2015, 
petroleum refined domestically made up little 
more than 5 per cent of the petroleum products 
consumed in the country.
This may change, as in 2015 the government signed 
a memorandum of understanding with Epic Refinery 
Group for the construction of a 100,000 b/d refinery 
in Delta Bayelsa State10 and the African magnate 
Aliko Dangote has commissioned a 650,000 b/d 
refinery which would more than double the country’s 
current refining capacity.11 With these two latest 
refinery plans, Nigeria aims again at becoming a net 
exporter with sufficient fuel capacity to supply its 
domestic market.
Nigeria aims again at becoming a net 
exporter with sufficient fuel capacity 
to supply its domestic market.
3MISMANAGEMENT OF THE 
STATE-OWNED REFINERY 
BUSINESS
The troubled state of Nigeria’s four existing state-
owned refineries reflects the management practices 
of the NNPC, including the following factors:
• The NNPC’s opaque handling of the money 
collected from crude sales has weakened the 
financial health and credibility of the NNPC. 
The government allocates about 445,000 
barrels to the NNPC for the domestic 
refineries daily, but since the four Nigerian 
refineries can only physically process around 
100,000 barrels per day, the reality is that 
the NNPC reroutes most of this crude to the 
export market or uses it for petroleum for 
product swaps. The payments from these 
transactions enter the NNPC accounts with 
no clear accounting rules and transparency. 
The NNPC has exerted discretionary 
withholding on these payments to finance 
subsidies and cash calls from operations 
and has been sending less and of less of 
this money to the Federal 
government over time.
• Inadequate funding and 
long decision-making 
processes have delayed 
important investments in 
maintenance and aging 
infrastructure. 
• The lack of trained, 
experienced staff has led 
to poor monitoring of the 
refinery systems.12
• Maintenance has 
been neglected due to 
shortages of spare parts. 
The combination of these 
issues has led to frequent 
shutdowns of units or 
entire refineries. Fires have 
occurred frequently at 
NNPC-operated refineries.
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• Disruption of distribution networks has 
resulted in losses. 40 per cent is lost due 
to sabotage, theft and equipment failure.13 
In 2011, for instance, the NNPC reported 
“Pipeline vandalism increased by 224 per 
cent over the previous year [see Figure 1]. A 
total of 2,787 line breaks were reported on 
NNPC pipelines out of which 2,768 were as a 
result of vandalism, while 19 cases were due 
to system deterioration resulting in a loss 
of 157.81 mt of petroleum products worth 
about N12.53 billion (roughly USD 77 million in 
2011). There were 25 fire incidents during the 
year under review.”14 This vandalism is often 
associated with the smuggling of petroleum 
products to neighbouring countries (The 
World Bank notes that the amount of 
petroleum smuggled is routinely close to 10 
per cent of operating capacity).15 Smuggling 
became a major source of corruption. The 
smuggling was largely encouraged by the 
fuel subsidy: petroleum products were sold in 
neighbouring markets at prices that were as 






































Figure 1. Pipeline vandalism incidents as per NNPC reports 
Source: Wapner, 201716 
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All of these problems have led Nigeria’s refineries 
to produce significantly less than their nameplate 
capacity (see Figure 2) and costs have soared 
despite a decline in output which has led to the 
NNPC to accumulate over USD 1 billion in arrears.17 18
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KEY LESSONS
• There are risks to downstream efforts; a 
government-led investment program to 
move downstream can drain public resources 
if unsuccessfully managed;
• If a national company is 
set to be a commercial operator 
of the downstream sector, it 
should operate under a rigorous 
governance framework isolated 
from political interference and 
endowed with sharp technical 
skills;
• Policy coherence is of 
utmost importance. The fuel 
subsidies at the pump, for 
example, squeezed the refinery 
sector from making profits and 
becoming self-sustainable, as it 
had to pay the unsubsidized rates 
for crude petroleum.
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